Is it the "least dangerous branch," or the tsar of an imperial judiciary? The principled defender of minorities-or studious follower of opinion polls and election returns? The "republican schoolmaster" to the American public or a voice whistling in the wind? Which of these characterizations of the United States Supreme Court fits the historical facts or-more realistically-under what circumstances are these notions accurate?
This paper addresses one aspect of these questions by assessing the capacity of the Supreme Court to influence public opinion on controversial constitutional issues.
There is a substantial empirical literature on whether the Supreme Court is responsive to public opinion, but with few exceptions (Marshall 1989; Franklin and Kosaki 1989 ) the opposite flow of influence has been unexamined. And because these studies rely on observational data (e.g. Hoekstra 1995 Hoekstra , 2000 Grosskopf and Mondak 1998) , they are unable to determine whether any opinion change that follows a controversial Supreme Court decision is due to the ruling itself-or the reactions of political elites to the ruling and the national debate that occurs in its wake.
There are sound reasons for believing that the public (or at least an informedenough public) might move in the direction of the Court's pronouncements on constitutional questions. As the institution without the power of the sword or the purse, the Court trades on its legitimacy. The rule of law is an important strand in the nation's dominant political creed. The Constitution is a revered symbol and Americans (in the abstract) defer to the notion of judicial review. Numerous surveys testify to the prestige of judges and also to the fact that the Supreme Court generally enjoys more public confidence than the other branches of government. Legitimacy is usually defined as the capacity to influence people to do what they otherwise would not do, even if this behavior involves a personal sacrifice. This conception may readily be extended to encompass the capacity to persuade; in a sense, legitimacy endows one with what is called "source credibility" in the literature on attitude change.
More concretely, citizens who endorse the Supreme Court's role in the American political system and who express confidence in its integrity and competence could be expected to be more likely to change their views once an authoritative decision on a constitutional controversy has been made. The more pervasive the legitimacy of the Court, the more influence on subsequent public opinion it should have. This premise is the origin of the main goal of the present research: to investigate the impact of the Supreme Court's decisions on public opinion about the issues under review. This clearly has important public implications given that the Court periodically makes counter-majoritarian decisions on emotional questions that touch on people's cherished values. In this context, the public's responses to such decisions fall into three broad categories: legitimation, backlash, and polarization. Legitimation refers to a movement in aggregate opinion toward the Court's position; backlash to the opposite kind of movement; and polarization to a situation in which blocs of the public move toward and away form the Court, respectively. Clearly, the ability to establish these influences is difficult with observational data. For one thing, the impact of any message on public opinion depends on it being received (Zaller 1992) and it is certainly plausible that substantial portions of the mass public remains unaware of the Supreme Court's decisions on even highly publicized issues. Second, the ability to isolate a particular event as a cause of opinion change is difficult at best. Movement in public opinion after a highly-publicized Court decision may be due to any one of several factors which have little to do with the content of the Court's ruling and the extent to which it is persuasive. Johnson (1989)), and gay sex (in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) )-and public opinion on these matters. But we also use this opportunity to examine a question that has been asked even more rarely: do Americans change their assessments of the Court when they disagree with its rulings? Although scholars have often theorized about whether the Court can lend its credibility to a particularly controversial decision, less has been said about whether unpopular rulings cause the Court to lose its credibility with the public.
To preview the results, we find that learning about the Court's ruling in Lawrence had a small, statistically significant impact on respondents who initially thought gay sex should be illegal or who were unsure about the issue. But being informed of the Roe v.
Wade or Texas v. Johnson rulings had no effect on respondents' opinions about these issues. We find a much larger impact in the opposite direction: on two of these three issues (flag burning and gay sex), respondents who disagree with the Court become more likely to say that the Court's power of judicial review should be curtailed. At the same time, however, there is no similar impact on feelings of confidence in the Supreme Court.
We believe that these findings illustrate the limited power of new information to change deeply held opinion, and that they suggest that the Supreme Court rarely fulfills the role of a "republican schoolmaster" (Franklin and Kosaki 1989) who educates the public to be more accepting of unpopular opinions.
The organization of the paper is as follows: the next section describes the sample employed and the experimental design. Next, we summarize the effects we observe of informing respondents of the specifics of the Court's decisions. Following a discussion of these sample-wide effects, we turn to the investigation of possible interactions-that is, the possibility of varied experimental outcomes in respondents differentiated by political ideology, prior opinion, or level of confidence in the Court. We conclude with a discussion of the findings and some thoughts about whether they are conditioned by the nature of the issues selected. Polimetrix's sampling technique is designed to obtain a nationally-representative sample, the extent to which the study's respondents were representative of the general population is less than ideal: we found that the panel was unexpectedly well-informed about politics (see Appendix) , and that it skewed liberal on the three issues. But the CCES design was well-suited for an experiment in which we wished to test whether learning of Court rulings would lead participants to change their stated opinions.
Our design was as follows: in the pre-election survey, respondents were asked their opinions on the three issues (see Table 1a for the question wordings). They were then asked two questions designed to measure their evaluation of the Supreme Court (Table 1b ). The first is a standard question employed in many opinion surveys (the GSS has used it since 1973) that asks respondents' their level of "confidence" in the Court.
The second is a measure developed by Gibson, Caldeira and Spence (2003) designed to capture what they call "diffuse support" for the Court. It asks respondents if they agree that "the right of the Supreme Court to decide certain types of controversial issues should be reduced."
Experimental manipulation took place in the post-election survey, which was administered between three to six weeks after the pre-election survey. All respondents were again asked their opinions on the three issues, but on each issue half of the respondents were randomly assigned to read a brief (one-sentence) description of how the Supreme Court had ruled on the issue before being asked their opinion (see Table 1a ).
The other half of respondents received no such description. Participants could thus receive the "treatment" of being informed of the Court's decisions on zero, one, two, or all three of the issues. After answering the questions about the three issues, all respondents were then again asked the two questions regarding their evaluation of the Court.
Descriptive Statistics
Pre-treatment marginals (Table 2) indicate that ideologues face an interesting tension: conservatives profess to have confidence in the Supreme Court (84 percent of conservatives have a "great deal" or "some" confidence), but they also wish to reduce the power of the Court (54 percent of conservatives said this). Liberals are exactly the opposite: 30 percent have "hardly any" confidence in the Court, but only 25 percent of liberals believe that the Court's powers should be reduced.
1 These findings support the assertions of Gibson, Caldeira and Spence (2003) that the "confidence" question captures short-term assessments of a Court that is currently viewed as more hospitable to conservative than liberal advocates, while the "reduce powers" question captures the longer-term assessment of the Court as an institution which has generally moved policy in a liberal direction in recent memory.
A similar ideological divide is found regarding the three controversial issues in our study. political protest" should be legal, only 20 percent of conservatives did. (As expected, self-described moderates fell between liberals and conservatives on all three of these issues-although their opinions on abortion and gay sex were more liberal than conservative.)
As we might expect given the strong relationship between respondents' ideology and their evaluation of the Supreme Court, a strong relationship also exists between respondents' agreement with Supreme Court rulings and their evaluations. As shown in Figure 1 , the number of the three controversial decisions with which respondents agree is negatively related to their preference for reducing the Court's ability to make controversial decisions. It is also (but non-monotonically) related to respondents' confidence in the Court-in the opposite direction than we might expect. To the extent that respondents hold policy preferences that align with Supreme Court rulings, they are less likely to express confidence in the Court. Table 4 Before considering effects of the treatment, a methodological digression: Because all three of the decisions about the court are in a liberal direction, each explanation of the court's ruling may be considered a "dose" of the "treatment" informing respondents of the liberal direction of the court's decisions on these three issues. In this paper, we alternate between considering each of the three treatments separately and analyzing them as interchangeable "doses" of the same treatment. It will also be helpful at times to divide respondents into two groups: those who received no messages about the Court's rulings on any of the three issues (while we call the control group), and those who received a message about the Supreme Court's rulings for at least one of the three issues (which we call the treatment group).
As shown in Table 5 , a randomization check performed by assessing whether any covariates of interest were inadvertently associated with assignment to the treatment found that this was not the case: no covariate is a statistically significant predictor of assignment to treatment, and likelihood ratio tests indicate that the covariates are not jointly significant predictors, either.
Analysis of Experimental Effects

Does the Court Influence Public Opinion?
We first analyze the extent to which learning of the Court's rulings had any effect on respondents' attitudes regarding legalization of abortion, flag burning, or homosexual sex. As shown in Table 6 , we don't see much movement in the direction we would expect regarding participants' responses to the treatment of learning the Supreme Court's rulings when we compare control and treatment groups.
However, when we make comparisons by pre-treatment opinions on each of these three issues, a few interesting findings emerge. As shown in Table 7a , those whose pretreatment attitude on abortion fell into the "other" category became significantly more pro-choice after receiving the treatment than did similar respondents in the control group.
However, we are reluctant to ascribe this to true opinion change. A cursory look at the verbatim responses of those in the "other" category indicated that many of these respondents could have been categorized as pro-choice. We think that receiving the treatment led these respondents to be more easily identify their opinion as falling into the most pro-choice of the response set. (Due to an oversight on our part, the "other" category was not offered to respondents in the post-election survey.) Table 7b shows that there was no movement on the flag burning issue, regardless of whether respondents learned about the Johnson ruling. Table 7c displays the strongest finding: those who originally thought that gay sex should be illegal or were unsure of their opinion became significantly more favorable toward legalization after receiving the treatment (compared to similar respondents in the control group). Receiving the treatment also moved more of those initially opposed to legalization into the "unsure" camp, while substantially decreasing the proportion of the initially unsure who remained so. Table 8 replicates these results in the regression context (Models I) and tests to see whether these effects are stronger among those who expressed confidence in the Court pre-treatment (Models II). As shown by the signs on the interaction terms in Models II, evidence is weak for this hypothesized augmenting effect.
Does the Public's Opinion about the Court Respond to Court Decisions?
We now turn to the extent to which respondents' attitudes toward the Court changed in response to being informed of specific rulings. The effect of the treatment was to move respondents of all ideological stripes to be more supportive of restricting the court's power relative to those respondents assigned to the control condition. Table 9 shows that while 51 percent of those in the treatment group favored reduction of the Court's powers in the post-election survey, only 35 percent of the control group did. Further analysis demonstrates that the effect was treatment-specific on two out of the three issues-flag burning and gay sex. That is, those whose attitudes on these issues ran counter to the Court's rulings in the pre-election survey became less supportive of the Court to when they learned about its rulings. Table 10 is an analysis predicting the posttreatment opinions on Supreme Court powers among those who did not think that these powers should be reduced before the treatment. As shown in the table, those who were exposed to the Johnson and Lawrence treatments were more likely to support reducing the Court's powers, ceteris paribus. But the effects of the treatments were blunted among those who agreed with the Court's decisions in these two cases, as shown by the negative sign on the interaction terms between opinions on flag burning and gay sex and receiving treatments on the Court's rulings on these two decisions. Johnson were driven by a strong "negativity bias" among those who disagreed with the decision.) And finally the Roe treatment appears to have had no effect on any of our respondents-as we would expect few of our highly-informed respondents to be unaware of the Roe ruling before participating in the survey.
The effect does not emerge as strongly for the "confidence in the Supreme Court" measure. As shown in Table 11 , treated respondents did, as a whole, express less confidence in the Supreme Court than did those in the control group. But the difference was too slight to be considered statistically significant (p = .33). Analysis of ideological groups (shown in Table 12 ) indicates that liberals and conservatives responded to the treatment in ways we might expect: treated liberals become more confident in the Court than liberals in the control group, while treated conservatives became less confident.
Multivariate analysis (not shown here) found that unlike the "reduce powers" measure, change in the "confidence" measure was not treatment-specific.
Conclusions
Table 13 summarizes our findings as described in this paper. Our preliminary analysis of these data indicate that of the three issues we studied, the Court's ability to influence public opinion is limited to its ruling striking down state laws banning consensual gay sex. This effect is small but significant: as shown in Table 7c , the marginal effect of being informed of the ruling was about six percentage points among those who initially favored making gay sex illegal, and a more considerable 29 points among those who were unsure beforehand.
The effects were stronger, and more consistent, in the "other direction": on two out of three issues we examined, respondents' opinion about the Court shifted in response to being informed of its rulings in ways that corresponded with the attitudes they had originally expressed about the issues addressed by the Court. As shown in Figure 3 , those opposed to flag burning in the treatment group were about 20 percentage points more likely to favor curtailing the Court's powers than those in the control group, holding other factors constant. The treatment of being informed of the Lawrence ruling led those in favor of legalizing consensual gay sex to be less supportive of reducing the Court's powers-and did just the opposite to those opposed to legalization.
Throughout, being informed of the "grandmother" of all controversial Supreme Court rulings-Roe v. Wade-appeared to affect our respondents not one whit. A natural conclusion to be drawn is that such a well-informed panel is likely to be saturated with knowledge about Roe and thus few respondents were truly learning from the treatment.
This is obviously only a first cut at the data from this rich experiment. Further work will examine the extent to which the effects were different for less-informed respondents.
(This will, unfortunately, throw into relief the drawbacks of having such a well-informed survey panel.) We also intend to look more carefully at the "movers" as a group to see if they have distinctive demographic or political characteristics. And we plan to think carefully about what principles are (or are not) being cued by the simple descriptions of the Supreme Court rulings used as treatments. Base category for opinion on gay sex and flag burning is "unsure"; for abortion it is "other." ---------------+----------------------+--------- ---------------+----------------------+--------- ---------------+----------------------+-------- Table 7b . Post-treatment attitudes on flag burning, by pre-treatment attitude 
shown text | 6 26 18 | 50 | 12.00 52.00 36.00 | 100.00 Probit coefficients significant at *p< .05, **p<01, ***p<.001
Shaded cells indicate coefficients are signed in the theoretically expected direction. -----------+--------------------------------------------+-------- 
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